

# The Sipah-e-Sahaba Dossier

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## Executive Summary

The Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and its militant offshoot, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), are sectarian organizations aiming to establish Pakistan as an exclusively Sunni state. Toward this end, the groups press politically for Shiites to be declared non-Muslims, and they back up their disdain for Shia by targeting their community in terrorist attacks. Though the SSP has been in existence for twenty years, when the LeJ split off from it in the mid-1990s, the pace and scale of the violence increased; in the last ten years, terrorists have killed more than 3,600 Shia.<sup>1</sup>

Both the SSP and the LeJ espouse violently anti-American and anti-Western rhetoric, and both are members of Osama bin Laden's International Islamic Front and close associates of Al Qaeda. Since 2001, they have targeted Americans and symbols of the West (including Pakistani Christians) in bombings and rifle attacks, often with the assistance of other Pakistani militant groups.

### Likelihood of Attacks in the United States: Low to Moderate

The Sipah-e-Sahaba and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi are unlikely to design and execute attacks on the United States on their own. The groups' focus has always been on suppressing Shia Islam in Pakistan, and nearly all of their operations are directed toward that end. In the United States, there are few visible Shiite centers of power and influence to target. Further, law enforcement actions taken against the groups have made discernable progress, and the organizations appear to have recently centered their attention on the most vulnerable targets in Pakistan, such as schools, mosques, and individual Shiites. Planning an attack on American soil would require a substantial presence in the United States and a great deal of money and coordination; at this point, such an operation by SSP or LeJ activists alone seems unfeasible.

In recent years, however, the cooperation between the LeJ and militant groups such as the Jaish-e-Mohammad, the Harakat ul-Mujahedin, and Al Qaeda has increased dramatically. Together, militants from these and other groups have staged vicious attacks against Western and American targets in Pakistan, forcing the U.S. State Department to withdraw almost all American personnel from the country. Individual LeJ militants, working with these terrorist coalitions, are more likely to successfully carry out an American attack; they pose a moderate threat. In short, the greatest threat to the U.S. posed by these anti-Shia groups lies in their ability to radicalize individuals, who are then susceptible to recruiting by other radicals for operations outside of Pakistan.

The coalitions of Pakistani militants are essentially extensions of Al Qaeda, and if they were to attack the United States, they would likely choose Al Qaeda's favored method: bombing. Car bombings, either by suicide terrorists or remote control, would be the most likely method of assault. Possible targets could include any structure symbolic of American culture or power; nearly every building in Washington and New York City could qualify. Alternately, these militant coalitions might use gunmen to breach a building, and then shoot as many of the people inside as possible.

Though these attacks are more probable than exclusively SSP or LeJ ventures, they would still be difficult to execute. Security at important American facilities is better than that provided for

Christian schools and Shiite mosques in Pakistan, making car bombings here more complicated. Moreover, the last few years have seen Al Qaeda's remnants contracting out their operations to domestic militant groups in various countries; this strategy of capitalizing on local knowledge is what has made the Pakistani militant coalitions so successful. SSP or LeJ militants conducting attacks in the United States sacrifice this advantage.

If SSP or LeJ militants did travel to the United States, they would likely take pains not to look like fundamentalist Muslims. In Pakistan, LeJ militants in covert cells are instructed not to wear long beards or traditional clothing, and they would probably continue this practice here. Because nearly all of the sectarian groups' cadres are native Pakistanis, they would likely hide in open sight in communities of recent immigrants from South Asia; for example, New York's boroughs, particularly the Atlantic Avenue area in Brooklyn, would provide ample opportunities. Many mosques sympathetic to the Taliban would grant militants housing and support, and extremely conservative Islamic organizations, such as the international society Tablighi Jamaat, might also offer assistance.

## Chapter I: History

Though Pakistan has remained true to its *raison d'être* as a nation for Muslims, it has never quite achieved the secular, pluralistic government envisioned by its founder, Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Instead, domestic rulers, foreign countries, and partisan leaders have exploited sectarian divisions within the land to undermine their enemies and increase their own influence. As a result of their efforts, many thousands of Pakistanis have died in sectarian violence, and the entire country has become increasingly bloodied and unstable over the last twenty-five years.

The main split among Pakistani Muslims is between the Sunnis and the Shia, and their disagreement extends back to Mohammad's death in the seventh century. The Shia believed that Mohammad's son-in-law, Ali, and his descendents should succeed him, while the Sunnis supported a successor chosen instead from their leader's close collaborators. Other theological differences emerged between the groups, but in the end, the Sunnis essentially won the argument; today, Sunnis constitute the overwhelming majority of the global Muslim population. Shia Muslims, living as minorities everywhere except Iran, Iraq, Bahrain, and Azerbaijan, have endured long periods of oppression and marginalization. Under Sunni rule, they have often been declared non-Muslims and persecuted as infidels (*kafir*).<sup>2</sup>

### Political Power and the Sectarian Divide

For the first thirty years of its existence, Pakistan did not follow this pattern. Though the country is 77% Sunni and 20% Shia, the two populations coexisted relatively peacefully, and any sectarian difficulties were overshadowed by economic and political struggles. This calm dissipated in 1977, however, when a military coup brought General Zia ul-Haq to power. A Sunni Muslim of the Deobandi sect (a strain of Islam closely allied with the Wahabism of Saudi Arabia), General Zia sought to reinforce his government's legitimacy by championing Sunni Islam.<sup>3</sup> He embarked on a

process of Islamization, implementing a Sunni version of *Sharia* law and forcing Shiites to pay a religious tithe (*zakat*) to the Government for the support of Sunni *madaris* (religious schools).<sup>4</sup>

At the same time, the success of the Islamic Revolution next door in predominately-Shia Iran—and the Ayatollah Khomeini’s promise to “export” it to other countries—tremendously encouraged the Pakistani Shia and unsettled General Zia, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the United States.<sup>5</sup> With the help of Iran, a group of Pakistani Shia formed the Tehreek Nifaz Fiqah-e-Jafria (TNFJ)—later shortened to Tehreek-e-Jaferia Pakistan, or TJP) to protect their interests in Pakistan. The TJP organized a massive demonstration in Islamabad on July 6, 1980, protesting Zia’s anti-Shia policies.



Figure 1: Map of Pakistan

It was the first and largest action of its kind in Pakistan’s history, and it startled both Zia and the foreign governments concerned about the spreading influence of Iran.<sup>6</sup>

In order to halt the activities of the TJP that undermined his political power, Zia turned to the central Pakistan region of Punjab, where a longstanding economic grievance had driven a wedge between the Sunni and Shia communities. Just before the partition that created Pakistan in 1947, a large-scale migration brought millions of Indian Muslims to settle in Pakistan. Many of these émigrés were Deobandi Sunnis, who began working on the large farms of Shia landowners. Though the succeeding years brought the development of a Sunni middle class in the region’s market towns, political and economic power remained in the hands of the feudal Shia landlords.<sup>7</sup> The Pakistani Government capitalized on the Sunnis’ economic frustration

and channeled it into a religious struggle by sponsoring the formation of another group, the Anjuman Sipah-e-Sahaba, in the mid-1980s.

The 1988 Shi’ite uprising in Gilgit, Pakistan marked the beginning of a significant increase in sectarian tension:

The last years of the Zia regime saw the Shias of Gilgit come out with a demand for a separate Shia State consisting of Gilgit and the Shia majority areas of Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). They wanted the Shia state to be called the Karakoram Province and remain part of a confederation of Pakistan.

The Zia regime crushed the Shia movement ruthlessly. In August 1988, the Pakistan Army inducted a large Sunni Tribal force from the NWFP and the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), led by Osama bin Laden, into Gilgit and it massacred hundreds of Shias and crushed their revolt. The hatred of the Shias for Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda dates from this period.

Shortly after this massacre, Zia died in a mysterious plane crash. Though the report of the enquiry commission has not been allowed to be released by the Army, it is generally believed by many in Pakistan that the crash of the aircraft was caused by a Shia airman on board the flight. In October 1991, Lt.Gen. (ret'd) Fazle Haq, a close associate of Zia, was assassinated in Peshawar, the capital of the NWFP, by Shia gunmen.<sup>8</sup>

### The Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan

This new organization, which soon changed its name to Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (“Guardians of the Friends of the Prophet,” or SSP), acted initially as a purely political counterweight to the TJP.<sup>9</sup> The SSP was effectively an offshoot of the primary Sunni religious party, the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (“Conference of Islam,” or JUI), a Deobandi group that supplied most of the Taliban from its many *madaris* in Pakistan.<sup>10</sup> The SSP took a more extreme stance than its parent organization, though, insisting that Pakistan be proclaimed an exclusively Sunni state. The group demanded that Shia Muslims be officially declared *kafir* and either converted or suppressed. SSP leaders intended to create a country full of “model Islamic cities,” where television, movies, and music were prohibited, by fully reinstating both the *Khilafat* (Caliphate) system and the Sunni *Shariat* (Islamic laws).<sup>11</sup>

In the 1980s, however, Pakistan was a militarized country, swimming in money, weapons, and *mujahedin* (holy warriors) headed to Afghanistan to defend Islam from the Soviets.<sup>12</sup> Many of the SSP cadres fought there, alongside Osama bin Laden and militant groups like the Harakat ul-Mujahedin (HUM) and the Harakat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI).<sup>13</sup> The retreat of the Soviet Army taught the militants that guerilla violence was their most potent political weapon, and SSP activists soon brought their armed *jihad* home. Translating what they learned in HUM training camps and combat to their fight against Shia Islam, SSP cadres initiated attacks that set off a bloody twenty-year cycle of sectarian violence.

In a typical SSP operation, militants on motorcycles would gun down individual Shiite leaders on the street, entering a mosque, or in their car. Victims were not exclusively TJP principals, though; all high-profile Shiites were targets—lawyers, doctors, government officials, businessmen, and intellectuals—as were leaders of rival Sunni groups.<sup>14</sup> As time went on, the SSP sought to inflict higher casualties on the Shia community through indiscriminately firing on worshippers gathered at Shiite mosques.<sup>15</sup> These attacks in turn inspired tit-for-tat killings by the TJP or other Shia groups, as when SSP founder Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi was assassinated on February 23, 1990.<sup>16</sup> Iranian citizens—seen as embodiments of Iran’s support of the Pakistani Shia—were also favorite targets of the Sunni militants, and the SSP took their revenge for Jhangvi’s death by murdering the Iranian Consul General, Sadiq Ganji, in a drive-by shooting in December 1990.<sup>17</sup>

SSP activities—and sectarian violence—did not long stay confined to the Punjab province. In 1988, at the instigation of Iranian intelligence, the Shia of Gilgit in the Northern Areas revolted against General Zia, demanding the creation of a new “Karakoram” province for Shiites.<sup>18</sup> Zia sent Pervez Musharraf to crush the rebellion, which he did by bringing in a number of Sunni tribesmen from the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), led by Osama bin Laden. Bin Laden’s men massacred the Gilgit Shiites. To keep the remaining Shia under control, Musharraf and the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) inducted the SSP into the Northern Areas and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) to help rally the local Sunnis against their Shiite neighbors.<sup>19</sup> Once present in such a large portion of the country, the SSP quickly expanded to the rest; at one time, it reportedly had 3,000-6,000 trained militants engaged in various anti-Shia activities and was called “the most powerful extremist group in the country.”<sup>20</sup>



Figure 2: Provincial Map of Pakistan

The SSP also maintained its close connections, born in the Pakistani *madaris* and Afghan training camps, with the Taliban. With the encouragement of the ISI, the SSP assisted the Taliban in their war against the Northern Alliance, helping them capture Jalalabad and Kabul in 1996.<sup>21</sup> After the Taliban seized the heavily Shiite areas of Mazar-i-Sharif and Bamiyan in 1998, SSP, Taliban, and Arab fighters massacred thousands of Hazara Shia.<sup>22</sup>

While continuing with their violent operations, however, the SSP sought to act as a legitimate political party. According to reports, it once had nearly 500 offices in all the districts of Punjab and claimed 100,000 registered party workers.<sup>23</sup> The group has often organized large rallies pressing for their anti-Shia agenda or for the release of arrested Sunni militants. The SSP also has made great efforts to maintain its place in Punjab’s coalition government, often through electioneering and contesting close races. In order to better its political position, the SSP has usually denied its involvement in violent incidents, even when it has been manifestly obvious. SSP leaders have gone so far as to publicly disavow all acts of terrorism and pledge their exclusive belief in negotiated resolutions to sectarian conflict, especially after 2001.<sup>24</sup>

### The Lashkar-e-Jhangvi

Between 1995 and 1996, the most radical elements of the Sipah-e-Sahaba splintered off to form a new organization, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (“Army of Jhangvi,” after the murdered SSP leader, or LeJ). Ostensibly, the LeJ members left in protest against the SSP’s recent steps toward moderation, including a dialogue with militant Shia groups.<sup>25</sup> The SSP has continually maintained that the two groups are completely separate, but a near-universal consensus among commentators and law enforcement officers in Pakistan disagrees. According to these sources, the LeJ merely

became the militant wing of the SSP, freeing the latter organization to disown violent sectarian acts and focus solely on political efforts. It can be nearly impossible to assign blame for incidents to one group or the other, and this plausible deniability, paired with their often decentralized leadership, has proven to be a “nightmare” for law enforcement agencies.<sup>26</sup>

Initially, the LeJ employed much the same operational strategy as the SSP, intermingling targeted assassinations of Shia leaders with mass shootings at Shiite mosques or graveyards. Expanding their arsenal beyond automatic rifles, LeJ cadres soon began using explosives to broaden their range of attacks. In January of 1999, the LeJ attempted to assassinate Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif by blowing up a bridge as his motorcade passed over it. The remote triggers misfired and the bridge was blown minutes before the Prime Minister reached it, allowing him to escape.<sup>27</sup> Militants have also mailed parcel bombs to police and government officials.<sup>28</sup> More recently, the LeJ has employed a particularly vicious strategy: militants throw hand grenades into a Shia mosque to incite panic, then gunmen on rooftops spray automatic rifle fire on those running to safety, while suicide bombers wrapped in explosives detonate themselves in the middle of the melee. This type of assault killed fifty-four Shiites in their Quetta mosque on July 4, 2003.<sup>29</sup>



**Figure 3: Victims of Quetta Attack**

The LeJ was led by Riaz Basra, a SSP militant who escaped police custody in 1994 after being convicted of the 1990 murder of Iranian Consul General Sadiq Ganji.<sup>30</sup> Basra was considered one of the most ruthless terrorists in the country, and he made eliminating Shia from Pakistan the group’s primary objective.<sup>31</sup> Under his command, the LeJ killed hundreds of leaders of rival sects, and Basra himself was implicated in the murders of at least 100 Shiites. After Basra was killed in May 2002 when police disrupted his attempted assassination of a Shia cleric, the LeJ’s leadership shifted to Asif Ramzi.<sup>32</sup> Ramzi’s fate was no more noble; he blew himself up accidentally while making bombs in a clandestine factory in Karachi.<sup>33</sup>

### Proscription and Reorganization

For many years, law enforcement efforts directed against the Sipah-e-Sahaba and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi were weak, at best. Both groups operated openly until August 14, 2001, when General Pervez Musharraf—who had used the SSP to help suppress Shiites in Gilgit—finally banned the LeJ and its rival Shia organization, the Sipah-e-Mohammad.<sup>34</sup> Though this at least made fund-raising and recruiting for *jihad* in open bazaars illegal, the ban probably would have had little effect, were it not for the events of September 11, 2001.

After the United States recruited Pakistan to join the “War on Terror” and track down Al Qaeda operatives, the domestic terrorist groups’ situation sharply changed. International pressure forced the Government to cut its ties with militant groups, and Musharraf announced in a televised speech on January 12, 2002, that there would be a domestic “war on extremism,” particularly Kashmir-based and sectarian groups.<sup>35</sup> Musharraf also officially banned the SSP, and soon thereafter the group’s remaining bank accounts were frozen.<sup>36</sup> Hundreds of SSP activists were arrested in the “crackdown” on militants that January, though most were released a short time later.<sup>37</sup>



**Figure 4: Azam Tariq and Supporters**

regarding those charges, released from jail, and soon became General Musharraf’s “most prominent Islamist ally.”<sup>39</sup> This closeness did not last long, though: Musharraf re-designated the MIP as a proscribed terrorist organization in September 2003. One month later, Tariq was assassinated by gunmen riding in a car, who sprayed his vehicle with automatic fire.<sup>40</sup>

Under this governmental pressure, both the SSP and the LeJ reorganized themselves. The SSP focused more intently on political power, renaming itself Millat-e-Islamia Pakistan (MIP) and curtailing its violence to dodge the ban on its activities. The switch worked so well that the SSP/MIP leader, Maulana Azam Tariq, won a seat in the Pakistani National Assembly in October 2002, despite being incarcerated at the time and facing fourteen counts of murder.<sup>38</sup> Tariq was granted amnesty

The LeJ took a different route: instead of becoming more public and less violent, it became far more secretive and considerably more violent. LeJ militants had occasionally been organized into small cells of five to eight people that operated independently, often without knowledge of other LeJ cells in the area. In 2002, however, the separation between cells increased, and the attacks undertaken began to bear marks of Al Qaeda influence, such as the use of suicide terrorism.<sup>41</sup>

LeJ members had long been connected to Osama bin Laden’s group, since many of their cadres fought together against the Soviets or trained at the same camps in Afghanistan.<sup>42</sup> The SSP and the LeJ also both joined the bin Laden’s International Islamic Front sometime after 1998, pledging their organizations to the mission of jihad against the Americans and the Jews.<sup>43</sup> LeJ leader Asif Ramzi, in particular, linked Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters with LeJ members, who sheltered the Afghans and Arabs as they retreated from the American invasion. This close cooperation led to other joint efforts, as Al Qaeda operatives trained LeJ activists in more aggressive terror operations, including suicide missions and the manufacture of rudimentary chemical weapons.<sup>44</sup> The LeJ also continued their sectarian attacks with renewed vengeance, accusing Shiite communities of providing information to Pakistani and American authorities hunting for Al Qaeda militants.<sup>45</sup>

## The Lashkar-e-Omar and the “313” Group

Al Qaeda’s influence also affected the goals of the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi in the wake of the American invasion of Afghanistan. Moving away from purely Muslim sectarian targets, some LeJ militants became fully converted to the Al Qaeda *jihad* against the United States and the West. Joined by assorted “freelancers” and militants from the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), and the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami, they began plotting attacks against Westerners, Americans, and Christians in Pakistan as part of a new organization, the Lashkar-e-Omar (“Army of Omar,” or LeO).<sup>46</sup>

Connections between the sectarian groups and the Kashmir-focused jihadi groups, such as the JeM, were long-standing. Maulana Masood Azhar, founder of the JeM, had been a student of Sipah-e-Sahaba founder Haq Nawaz Jhangvi and a SSP militant under the command of Azam Tariq.<sup>47</sup> Azhar deliberately kept the groups close, saying in October 2000, “Now we go hand-in-hand, and Sipah-e-Sahaba stands shoulder-to-shoulder with Jaish-e-Mohammad in Jihad.”<sup>48</sup> Likewise, shared time in Deobandi madrassahs and Afghan training camps tied the SSP and the LeJ to the Harakat ul-Mujahedin and the HUJI.<sup>49</sup> As governmental pressure against all the groups increased, they found their most successful strategy was to intermingle their groups in small, discrete cells and lash back at General Musharraf, Americans, or any proxies for them that could be found.

The loose coalition calling itself the LeO carried out its first attack on a St. Dominic’s Church in Bahawalpur on October 28, 2001. Seventeen Christians—five of whom were children—were killed when gunmen burst through the doors during a service and opened fire. The LeO claimed responsibility for the murders, intending them to be “punishment acts” of terrorism against the United States, despite the fact that none of the victims were Americans.<sup>50</sup> Christians, even native Pakistanis, were merely symbols of the West to the militants. Other, more aggressive acts followed, including suicide car bombings in Karachi outside the Sheraton Hotel and at the American Consulate, which killed eleven Frenchmen (mistaken for Americans) and seventeen Pakistanis.<sup>51</sup> Christian churches, hospitals, and schools were attacked, and militants made two attempts on General Musharraf’s life in December of 2003.<sup>52</sup>

Another coalition of militants, this time from the LeJ, the Harakat ul-Mujahedin al-Alami (HUM-A), the JeM, and the HUJI, also appeared in 2003. This “313” group targeted several Pakistani political officials and intended to fight the United States and its allies, but its only large attacks were sectarian in nature. One of these incidents was the July 4, 2003, massacre in a Quetta mosque; the other was the drive-by shooting of a bus carrying Shi’ite employees of the Government’s Space and Upper Atmospheric Research Commission (SUPARCO) in October 2003. Since then, no attacks have been attributed to the group.<sup>53</sup>

## Daniel Pearl and Al Qaeda

The most infamous—and possibly the most complicated—act of terror committed by these inter-organizational cells was the kidnapping and murder of *Wall Street Journal* reporter Daniel Pearl in January 2002. Ahmad Omar Saeed Sheikh, a *jihadi* closely involved with both the HUM and the JeM (and for whom the LeO was probably named), lured Pearl to a fictitious meeting with a “source” for his story on Al Qaeda and shoe-bomber Richard Reid. He was held hostage while militants demanded the release of Pakistanis in U.S. custody, and when their conditions were not

met, the militants videotaped Pearl's throat being cut.<sup>54</sup> Sheikh and three others were on trial for the crime, and Pakistani authorities appeared to be laying blame at the feet of the JeM, when several LeJ militants in custody led police to a field containing the body of Daniel Pearl. Making matters still more entangled, the body was found on property owned by the Al Rashid Trust, a "charitable organization" set up by the Inter-Services Intelligence to funnel international donations to Al Qaeda.<sup>55</sup>

Eventually, investigators came to the conclusion that two totally distinct cells, made up of militants from several different organizations, carried out the crime. The group led by Omar Sheikh arranged the kidnapping, but LeJ militants performed the actual murder and disposed of the body.<sup>56</sup> Many observers considered the LeO responsible for coordinating the entire operation, but the crime's degree of sophistication pointed clearly to Al Qaeda involvement behind the scenes.

Al Qaeda's shadowy connection to the Daniel Pearl murder reflects their broader involvement with the LeO and with Pakistani *jibadi* groups. Most intelligence reports do not think that a centralized Al Qaeda leadership is issuing orders to these militant coalitions. Instead, the group has achieved something even better: it has outsourced the *jihad* to local organizations. Groups like the LeJ and the JeM have turned from their original targets (Shiites and the Indian Army) to attack American interests and attempt to destabilize the Government.<sup>57</sup> These domestic groups are far more adept at doing reconnaissance, moving men and arms, and conducting operations in their own countries than Al Qaeda members could be.<sup>58</sup> Sectarian and *jibadi* groups have been particularly good at recruiting, bringing in a stream of young men without criminal records who are nearly impossible to identify or arrest.<sup>59</sup> Al Qaeda is still involved, though: according to Pakistani officials, bin Laden's group provided the money, weapons, and training for the attacks on the U.S. Consulate, the Sheraton Hotel, and Daniel Pearl.<sup>60</sup>



**Figure 5: Daniel Pearl and Captor**

### From Pakistan to Iraq?

Despite cooperating with other *jibadi* groups and Al Qaeda, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi has not been able to escape all the effects of the "War on Terror" in Pakistan. The LeJ has not carried out a major attack since December of 2004, and the Lashkar-e-Omar militant union seemingly faded away after December of 2003. The "313" group has not been heard from since October 2003. The Sipah-e-Sahaba/Millat-e-Islamia also has been quiet; it also has not been linked to violent incidents in Pakistan since 2003. This respite has mysterious origins, though: certainly counter-terror work by the Pakistani Government has helped considerably, though their justice system has serious flaws. Pakistani officials have even claimed that the LeJ has been "virtually decimated."<sup>61</sup> It cannot be said, however, that sectarian groups like the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi or the Sipah-e-Sahaba are gone for good; no one knows if or when they will re-emerge.

One troubling thought is that LeJ and SSP militants may have traveled to Iraq to participate in the *jihad* against American forces there. B. Raman of the South Asia Analysis Group claims that SSP and LeJ members traveled to Saudi Arabia disguised as *hajj* pilgrims, then slipped over the border to Iraq.<sup>62</sup> American power, however, is not the only threat to Sunni militants in Iraq; the country is primarily Shia, and the 2005 elections returned power to them. Many Sunni-controlled nations are nervous about a Kurdish-Shiite government, wondering how it will affect the tense balance of power in the Middle East.<sup>63</sup> Certainly, recent sectarian attacks in Iraq strongly resemble LeJ operations in Pakistan, particularly the high-casualty suicide and car bombings at Shiite mosques and funeral services.<sup>64</sup> The depth of connection between the Pakistani sectarian groups and the attacks on Iraqi Shia is difficult to estimate, however, leaving the current status of the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and the Sipah-e-Sahaba in question.

## Chapter II: Threat Assessment

### Threat From Sectarian Groups: Low

Though the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and, to a lesser extent, the Sipah-e-Sahaba/Millat-e-Islamia are intimately connected with Al Qaeda, the two groups are unlikely to successfully attack the United States. Their resources and knowledge base are tied to Pakistan and South Asia, and when they operate outside those areas—in Chechnya, Afghanistan, or Iraq, for instance—they do so either with the implicit approval of governments or in areas where governments have little or no control. The security measures of the United States are likely to prevent this type of movement.

Moreover, the central grievance around which these groups were organized—that heretic Shiites possessed too much influence in Pakistan—does not really apply in the United States. The American Government is an enemy because of its supposedly anti-Muslim policies (such as chasing Osama bin Laden or deposing the Taliban) or because it has been promoting Shiite causes (often by promoting democracy), not because it is a locus of Shia power. Though Al Qaeda has drafted many LeJ militants to participate in attacks against American interests in Pakistan, the focus of the group as a whole has remained on undermining the Shia community. A car bombing near a Karachi church in January 2004 was the last LeJ attack on Christians, Americans, or the Pakistani Government; since then, all LeJ acts have been directed at Shiites. The SSP/MIP has not been connected to any non-sectarian violence, though many SSP militants—including the Jaish-e-Mohammad's Masood Azhar and Al Qaeda's Ramzi Yousef and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi—later joined other organizations.<sup>65</sup> This latter case demonstrates the principal threat of this group to the U.S. Homeland. That is as a radicalizing influence and feeder group to other, more threatening terrorist cells. Additionally, Pakistani groups are known to provide a range of support to individuals and cells determined to lash out against America (e.g., disrupted cell in Lodi, California)

## Threat From Sectarian Cadres with Al Qaeda: Moderate

Though the SSP and the LeJ *as organizations* are unlikely to sponsor an American attack, both groups are tied to Al Qaeda and have provided it with significant support since the fall of the Taliban. LeJ members have rented houses for Al Qaeda operatives, hiding them in large cities like Karachi.<sup>66</sup> Within Pakistan, the LeJ has been so cooperative with bin Laden's group that it has often been called "the Pakistani wing of Al Qaeda."<sup>67</sup> Further, former SSP/LeJ militants, such as Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, have gone on to major roles in the World Trade Center attacks of 1993 and 2001.<sup>68</sup> Thus, these groups present two threats to the United States: first, they continue Al Qaeda's mission in Pakistan (and possibly in Iraq), including contributing to attacks on American interests and their pro-American government. Second, individual militants sometimes join Al Qaeda's international activities, which have included attacks within the United States.

### Possible Developments

Several factors could influence the gravity of these threats. The Millat-e-Islamia has operated as a political party in Pakistan, and it is conceivable—though highly unlikely—that it or other fundamentalist religious parties could be democratically elected to govern. Obviously, this would place enormous nuclear power in the hands of people who hate America, even if they hate Shiites more. While no threat could be greater than this, it is also an improbable course of events. Though religious parties made great gains in the 2002 Pakistani elections, the MIP National Assembly member, Azam Tariq, was not part of their alliance, and the proscription of the MIP (and Tariq's death) in 2003 has likely dampened some of the group's political momentum.



**Figure 6: Police Arrest Sipah-e-Sahaba Militant**

However, the *jihadis* intent on harming the United States tend to gather at its weakest points. In 2001, militants flocked into Afghanistan to fight American troops for the Taliban; after its defeat and their routing, they crossed the border into Pakistan. Since then, at least some of them have reappeared in Iraq to plague the American forces, the Iraqi police, and the Shiites there. All three of these countries have lax border security, allowing large infiltrations that would likely be more difficult, but not impossible, along American borders.

The single largest factor affecting the domestic threat of SSP/LeJ terror attacks is the progress of the "War on Terror." If the hunt for Al Qaeda and sectarian terrorists in Pakistan continues, and—especially—if pressure on Saudi Arabian, British, and Pakistani financing sources dries up militants' funds, the SSP/LeJ's potency will be greatly decreased. Pressure against leadership and finance makes it much more difficult for the sectarian groups that have supported Al Qaeda to be able to carry out *jihad*.

## Chapter III: Recruiting

### Madaris

According to Sipah-e-Sahaba leader Mujibur Rehman Inqalabi, *madaris* are “the engine of jihad” and its “supply line.”<sup>69</sup> His remark is no less true for its surprising honesty: nearly all Pakistani militants and *jihadis*—as well as the Afghani Taliban—have emerged out of the thousands of religious schools educating Pakistan’s youth. The SSP itself supports at least 176 such institutions, and the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam, the SSP’s parent organization, operates thousands more.<sup>70</sup> These schools preach a fundamentalist Sunni Deobandi Islam that declares Shia Muslims to be *kafirs* and *jihad* to be a spiritual obligation practically identical to guerilla warfare. With no instruction beyond rote memorization, *madrasa* graduates have skills only employable as low-level clerics, and many follow the more glorious path of their heroes and become Islamic militants.<sup>71</sup>

Nearly a third of schooled children receive their education in *madaris*, largely because the privately-funded institutions provide shelter, food, and clothing—and occasionally, even a stipend—for otherwise utterly poor children. Often these *madaris* are financed by donations from Saudi Arabians, who seek to promote Deobandi/Wahabi Sunni Islam (and suppress Shi’ism) by indoctrinating children.<sup>72</sup> Thanks to this private education system, many poor Pakistanis caught their instructors’ enthusiasm for *jihad* and headed off to militant training camps.

### Universities and Tablighi Jamaat

Recently, though, the profile of LeJ members has been changing, as Al Qaeda’s influence pulled the group toward suicide bombings, rather than shootings. These new recruits have been young, educated, and well-trained; they are middle-class Pakistani, often considered “model young men.”<sup>73</sup> They appear drawn particularly to martyrdom as a means for both fulfilling their *jihad* and ensuring the social and economic standing of their family, which is provided by Sunni communities.<sup>74</sup> Recruits are frequently gathered from the student wings of the SSP, active at many Pakistani universities.<sup>75</sup>

Almost all members of the SSP or the LeJ are Pakistanis, but their involvement with the international Muslim missionary society, Tablighi Jamaat, opens them to recruits from other countries. The Tablighi Jamaat, a conservative Islamic organization claiming to be nonpolitical and nonviolent, also has been linked to several terrorist organizations, including the Harakat ul-Mujahedin, the Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami, the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, and



Figure 7: Sipah-e-Sahaba March in Islamabad

the Jaish-e-Mohammad.<sup>76</sup> Well suited for recruiting terrorists internationally, the Tablighi Jamaat has a presence in dozens of countries and ten American states, and it boasts up to 50,000 American followers, according to the Defense Intelligence Agency. If its claims of innocence are to be believed, it must be an easily infiltrated and co-opted organization; if not, it is one of the most powerful terrorist recruiting tools in the world.<sup>77</sup>

### Core Philosophy

All SSP and LeJ recruits, regardless of their origin, have a few beliefs in common. Most importantly, they are Sunni Muslims who believe that Shia Islam is heresy, and that its presence in Pakistan and participation in public life is a disgrace that must be eliminated. The best way to achieve this is to have Shiites officially declared non-Muslims, or *kaafirs*, and to make Pakistan a purely Sunni state. The influence of Iran, the great champion of Shia Muslims, must be checked in all possible ways. Further, the United States, as the “enemy of Islam” and the sometime friend of Shiites, is to be opposed on all fronts.

Their version of Deobandi Islam is also very similar to the philosophy of the Taliban, and the SSP and the LeJ share their mix of fundamentalism and totalitarianism. Ultimately, the sectarian groups would like to see the Taliban’s version of *Sharia* law enacted in Pakistan, confining women to strict roles and forbidding movies, alcohol, and music. Back in 1994, the SSP blocked New Year’s festivities in Pakistan by threatening violence against any teenage revelers; the Government ordered all hotels and restaurants to cancel any parties and warned those intending to celebrate at home to be quiet about it.<sup>78</sup> Non-Muslim religious minorities also have sparked the SSP’s ire, as when it demanded the death penalty for an illiterate fifteen-year-old Christian boy convicted of blasphemy for writing “objectionable words” about Mohammad on a poster. Leader Azam Tariq publicly stated, “Anyone who commits blasphemy will be killed, if not by law then by SSP.”<sup>79</sup>

### Chapter IV: Training

Members of the Sipah-e-Sahaba and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi were trained at Harakat ul-Mujahedin camps near Khost in Afghanistan, possibly in conjunction with Al Qaeda.<sup>80</sup> Assuming



**Figure 8: Victims of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Bombing**

that the instruction they received was the same as that given to HUM militants, SSP and LeJ members were taught how to use rocket-propelled grenades, explosives, mortars, and guns.<sup>81</sup> More advanced students would learn bomb making and the manufacture and storage of explosives (nitroglycerin, HMDT, C-3, and C-4). Other HUM classes covered “how to kill a policeman,” “traps, murder, and terrorist moves,” “hit teams,” and the hijacking of airplanes, buses, and ships. Students also may have taken courses in espionage and secure communications.<sup>82</sup> Naturally, a significant

part of the day was also devoted to ideological training. The virtues of Sunni Islam were extolled daily, and the idea of *jihad* and the requirements of it featured prominently in the teaching.<sup>83</sup>

When LeJ founder Riaz Basra was on the run from Pakistani authorities, he reportedly retreated to the HUM camp until he was able to establish his own LeJ terrorist training camp at Sarobi, near Kabul, Afghanistan. Similar to the HUM-run facility, the LeJ camp instructed men on the use of firearms and explosives, particularly for sectarian attacks in Pakistan and for ground fighting against the Northern Alliance.<sup>84</sup> He likely also offered instruction specializing in car and parcel bombs, assassinations on motorcycles and from cars, and forging identity documents.

Back in Pakistan, training continued for some LeJ militants. Al Qaeda operatives working with the LeJ have been responsible for introducing methods of suicide bombing to the group.<sup>85</sup> According to Pakistani authorities, two Arab men in Karachi (probably Al Qaeda affiliates) taught several religious students more about bomb manufacture. Shortly thereafter, suicide car bombs designed by those men killed twenty-eight people near the U.S. Consulate and the Sheraton Hotel.<sup>86</sup>

## Chapter V: Operations

The form of Sipah-e-Sahaba and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi operations has broadened slowly over the last twenty years, but they largely fall into one of three categories: sectarian, political, or anti-Western attacks. The few incidents that fall outside these headings, including the 1995 vandalism of the Islamabad BBC offices (in retaliation for a negative portrayal of the SSP in a documentary), have not been central to the groups' missions. The SSP/MIP has also staged large political rallies and continued to publish the monthly paper *Khilafat-I-Rashida*, but their non-violent activities will not be addressed here.<sup>87</sup>

While the SSP has often disavowed its violence, the LeJ shows no such shame about its activities. It often claims attacks by calling newspaper offices—a unique characteristic among Pakistani terror groups. It has also continued to publish a magazine, *Inteqame Haq* (Rightful Revenge) that frequently details its crimes and attempts to justify them.<sup>88</sup>

### Sectarian Attacks

The Sipah-e-Sahaba and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi consider the suppression of Shia Islam to be their mission, so the vast majority of their terrorist acts have been sectarian in nature. The groups initially preferred to assassinate leaders of Shia or rival Sunni organizations; typically, militants on motorcycles rode close to the victim and fired on him with Kalashnikov assault rifles. The terrorists soon expanded their hit list to include all high-profile Shiites, targeting lawyers, doctors, government officials, intellectuals, and businessmen. Also, Iranian citizens were often attacked, since Iran was the great patron of Shia Islam.<sup>89</sup> The crimes were almost always perpetrated with guns, though one Shiite politician was killed by a remote-controlled landmine detonated beneath his car.<sup>90</sup>

To achieve a greater reaction from their acts of terror, the SSP and the LeJ began assaulting worshippers at Shia mosques (*imambargahs*) and graveyards. At first, masked gunmen would drive by

a mosque or funeral procession, and militants would fire indiscriminately upon the crowd with automatic rifles.<sup>91</sup> LeJ terrorists graduated to more complex methods, though, including bombings. An engineer buried a bomb beneath an *imambargah* in Punjab in April 2002, and its detonation killed nine women and three children.<sup>92</sup> Their most deadly method of attack combined hand-held explosives, suicide bombers, and gunfire. The previously mentioned attack on July 4, 2003, in Quetta followed this formula: militants threw grenades into a mosque to create confusion, then gunmen on nearby rooftops fired on fleeing Shiites as suicide bombers blew themselves up amidst the crowd. Fifty-four Shia were killed, and sixty-five people injured.<sup>93</sup> Recent reports have warned that the LeJ may be planning attacks using female suicide bombers, a practice heretofore unheard of in Pakistan, but no such incidents have yet occurred.<sup>94</sup>

### Political Attacks

Though the main focus of sectarian groups is on religious conflict, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi has often clashed with the government officials. Both the SSP and LeJ militants have often targeted police officers in shootings, but the LeJ has extended its activities to include bombings. In October of 2002, the group mailed at least ten parcel bombs to police and government officials; three exploded, injuring nine people.<sup>95</sup>



Figure 9: Sipah-e-Sahaba Militants

Other attacks have been directed at destabilizing the Government. LeJ activists have been involved in three attempted assassinations of heads of state: Nawaz Sharif in January 1999 and Pervez Musharraf on the 14<sup>th</sup> and 25<sup>th</sup> of December in 2003. All three attempts involved explosives. The first two operations sought to blow up a bridge as the President's car crossed it (the remote triggers failed both times), and in the third effort, terrorists tried to ram cars laden with C-4 explosive into the Presidential motorcade. None of the attempts succeeded, though forty-six people were injured in the car bombing.<sup>96</sup>

### Anti-Western Attacks

Though anti-Americanism has long been a part of the ideology of the Sipah-e-Sahaba and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, it did not become a forceful enough to elicit violence until the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. After the Taliban fell and governmental pressure began to bear down on the SSP and the LeJ, Pakistani terrorist groups reorganized into loose coalitions such as the Lashkar-e-Omar, which turned from those groups' typical targets to assault "American interests" in Pakistan. LeJ members participated in the most famous attacks on Americans, including the kidnapping and murder of *Wall Street Journal* reporter Daniel Pearl and the suicide car bombing outside the U.S. Consulate (which killed twelve people—all Pakistanis).<sup>97</sup>

The militants defined “American interests” broadly, including all Westerners and all Christians in their reach. LeJ members attacked these stand-ins for America as brutally as they had Shia mosques, bursting into churches and opening fire on worshippers in Bahawalpur and Islamabad. LeJ gunmen also assaulted a Christian school, hospital, and charitable organization as part of LeO cells. At least thirty-nine Christians were killed in the year between October 2002 and September 2003.<sup>98</sup>

### Operational Planning

Prior to 2002, the Sipah-e-Sahaba and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi appeared to have relatively stable organizational structures, and orders passed down recognizable chains of command. One national leader oversaw the entire group, and divisional heads kept watch over individual provinces.<sup>99</sup> The SSP/MIP likely maintains a similar structure now, though its operations have turned exclusively toward the political arena. Essentially, it remains the overt half of a larger sectarian union, with the LeJ forming the covert half. The LeJ, however, has become something more akin to a cluster of discrete cells, and its directives have a less clear origin.

The cells themselves are usually made up of two to five (but up to eight) militants, instructed to gather, perform their task, then disband immediately and regroup later at a specified location.<sup>100</sup> They use cellular phones to communicate with each other, but they use anonymity as a firewall, preventing law enforcement officials from infiltrating the larger organization.<sup>101</sup> An Al Qaeda manual found in February 2004 explains that cells should not be aware of each other, and leaders should never speak to other cell leaders. None of the militants were to contact the *nasm* (executive); if necessary, it would contact them. Names and personal details were not to be shared with other cell members.<sup>102</sup> Terrorists trained for suicide attacks are specifically required to keep a low profile while waiting for their orders; they are told to return to their homes and jobs, eschew beards and traditional Muslim clothes, appear neat and tidy, have all proper identification papers (legitimate ones, created for aliases), and do nothing illegal, for fear of raising alarm.<sup>103</sup>

Before an attack, a reconnaissance team typically scouts the area. Usually, this involves little more than walking around the vicinity, as when a militant involved in the bombing of a church service in Islamabad visited the church for several weeks before killing five people there in March 2002.<sup>104</sup> It is occasionally more complicated: to reconnoiter the U.S. Consulate before the June 2002 car bombing, militants sent a fake wedding party to the area to disguise the man videotaping the buildings.<sup>105</sup>

### Weapons Capabilities

The Sipah-e-Sahaba and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi have employed many different weapons and attack strategies in the pursuit of their goals. Both groups are best versed in conventional arms, especially Kalashnikov assault rifles, which have been used in hundreds of assassinations and indiscriminate massacres. The SSP and the LeJ have also both utilized explosives, including landmines, rocket launchers, and grenades, though the LeJ has greater expertise. LeJ militants have used remote-controlled bombs to blow up bridges, car and motorcycle bombs, briefcase and parcel bombs, and suicide bombers to maximize the damage inflicted.

The LeJ also has some degree of chemical weapons capability. In 2002, three secret LeJ chemical laboratories were discovered in Karachi, where LeJ militants were clearly working to create poisonous gases. It is still not clear how successful the militants' efforts at manufacture were, but it is obvious that the group was preparing for a specific event.<sup>106</sup>

## Chapter VI: American Support

The Sipah-e-Sahaba has had a presence on American soil in the past, indicating that there is at least some determined support for sectarian groups here. In 1994, the SSP claimed to have branches in twenty-four countries, including the United Kingdom, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bangladesh, India, the United Arab Emirates, Australia and the South Pacific. They opened two offices in the United States: one in California, where they counted 1,000 followers, and one in New York City, at an undisclosed location. SSP leader Zia ur-Rehman Farooqi (who succeeded Haq Nawaz Jhangvi) traveled from Pakistan to open the New York office, which he said was established to raise money for the organization. According to Farooqi, the SSP's goal was to fight Shia Islam and see Pakistan become a Sunni state, but he denied SSP involvement in any violence.<sup>107</sup> Ten years later, the current status of those American SSP/MIP bureaus is unknown.

If the SSP/MIP offices in New York and California have remained open, they would be the natural base for propaganda distribution, recruiting, fundraising, and all other means of assistance. Without them, sectarian activists would likely operate out of fundamentalist mosques in the United States, particularly mosques tied closely to Pakistan or Afghanistan. Pakistani or Afghani immigrant communities would be the most likely place for SSP or Lashkar-e-Jhangvi terrorists to hide, both camouflaging their arrival and keeping them close to their supporters. Given their propensity for disguising identities, any Pakistani militants traveling to the United States would almost certainly carry documents either forged or made out for an false name. The groups have not been known, however, to have secured American passports.

The presence of SSP branches in the United States probably means that the group at least attempted to recruit Americans into its organization. If they did this, however, they would likely have encouraged the volunteer to go to Pakistan or Afghanistan to a militant training camp, as American recruits to other Pakistani extremist groups did. Terrorist groups recruiting in North America have tended to call men to the *jihad* elsewhere in the world, though this may have changed since 2001. At the same time, any remaining sectarian organizations in the United States may have been shut down or closely watched because of their Al Qaeda connections. No reports of American SSP or LeJ activists have surfaced.

## Chapter VII: Financing

Most early financing for the Sipah-e-Sahaba probably came from the intelligence agencies of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the United States, as those countries tried to counter the rise of

Shia power, the influence of Iran, or the Soviet presence in Afghanistan.<sup>108</sup> Though Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence continued to assist the SSP, wealthy Pakistanis and Arabs, particularly Saudi Arabians, soon supplied the bulk of its bankroll. Most donations are anonymous and arrive directly in SSP or Lashkar-e-Jhangvi bank accounts.<sup>109</sup>

The SSP and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi have also benefited from *zakat* (a religious tithe) funds and contributions from local Sunni organizations and trusts, *madaris* and religious study circles, and political groups.<sup>110</sup> One charitable fund in particular, the Al Akhtar Trust, funneled money to the LeJ, Al Qaeda, the Jaish-e-Mohammad, and the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba. Though registered as a humanitarian aid agency, it also supplied logistical support and travel arrangements for militants. According to the U.S. Treasury Department, which froze the group's assets in October 2003, Al Akhtar was continuing the work of the Al Rashid Trust, the charitable organization that raised money for *jihad* in Iraq and on whose property Daniel Pearl's body was found.<sup>111</sup>

Since 2001, many of the old sources of financing for the SSP and the LeJ have dried up: fundraising in bazaars and shops is now prohibited, and international "charitable" networks based in the Middle East are being slowly shut down. Yet new sources of capital have opened up within Pakistan as cooperation in the "War on Terror" brings American dollars back into the country. Some of those funds migrate through many hands, ironically financing the very groups the American Government is trying to prosecute.<sup>112</sup>

## Chapter VIII: Connections with Other Groups

Initially, the Sipah-e-Sahaba was nearly a state-sponsored terrorist group, financed and equipped by the Inter-Services Intelligence. The ISI has also helped free Lashkar-e-Jhangvi cadres from jail after arrest and provided training to militants on how to accurately shoot from a moving motorcycle.<sup>113</sup> Quickly, though, the SSP and the LeJ began to shrug off ISI control, and the organizations are totally separate today (though some ISI member still sympathize with the militants).<sup>114</sup>

As discussed previously, both the SSP and the LeJ have proven amenable to considerable cooperation with Sunni militant parties such as the Jaish-e-Mohammad, the Harakat ul-Mujahedin, and the Harkat ul-Jihad al-Islami. Sectarian militants trained at HUM camps in Afghanistan, and the JeM has maintained very tight connections to the LeJ since its inception. The groups all share the same extremist Deobandi/Wahabi Sunni Islam, were educated in the same *madaris*, and fought together in Afghanistan. These ties link also Pakistani organizations to the Taliban and Al Qaeda, whose anti-Shia sectarianism is an oft-overlooked, but important, part of their political goals.<sup>115</sup>

Since 2001, all of these groups have intermixed personnel and resources, often working together on large terror attacks. The Lashkar-e-Omar and the "313" group reflect this trend, mixing Pakistani sectarians and *jihadis* with Al Qaeda and Taliban fugitives to attack American targets and destabilize General Musharraf's government. With few perceptible boundaries between the groups, discerning who gives militants orders and bringing them to justice has become a profoundly difficult obstacle for Pakistani law enforcement.

## Appendix I: Partial Listing of Attacks

Date	Org(s)	Description	
1986	SSP	Sunni leader of Ahl-e-Hadith assassinated	
1987	SSP	Sunni leader Maulana Habib-ur-Rehman Yazdani assassinated	
1988	SSP	Shiite leader of TJP, Arif Hussain Al-Hussaini, killed	
1990	Dec	SSP	Iranian diplomat Sadiq Ganji killed in drive-by shooting in Lahore
1992	Jun	SSP	5 policemen killed in rocket launcher attack
1994	Jul	SSP	Bus carrying Shiites attacked by masked gunmen with grenades; 6 killed
1994	Nov	SSP	5 people killed in office of TJP in McCloud Ganjh
1994	Nov	SSP	7 Shiites killed in bus attack
1994	Dec	SSP	13 Shiites (including 5 relatives of police chief) killed in Karachi
1995	Feb	SSP	20 Shiites killed in 2 attacks on mosques
1995	Mar 7	SSP	Shiite leader of TJP, Dr. Syed Mohammed Ali Naqvi, shot with 2 others by gunmen on motorcycles
1995	Mar 11	SSP	Motorbike bomb explodes at Karachi mosque, gunmen fire on those coming to aid; 10 killed (7 children), dozens wounded
1995	Aug 24	SSP/LeJ	BBC office in Islamabad vandalized--equipment destroyed, hall bombed, set on fire; 3 Westerners beaten
1996	May 2	LeJ	3 activists freed by force from police custody in Hasilpur
1996	Aug 18	LeJ	Revenge attack on Shiite mosque kills 15, wounds 50, in Punjab
1996	Sep	SSP	Shia leader of TJP, Mumtaz al Hassan, killed by 2 motorcyclists
1997		LeJ	4 American oil workers killed in Karachi
1997	Jan 19	SSP	Iranian Cultural Center in Lahore set on fire; 17,000 books destroyed
1997	Feb 20	LeJ	Iranian Cultural Center in Multan attacked and set on fire; director and 6 staff killed--fake wedding fireworks disguise gunfire
1997	May	LeJ	Superintendent of Police Ashraf Marth and 2 others killed by 4 men in Gujranwala
1997	Sep 17	SSP/LeJ	5 Iranian Air Force technician trainees and driver killed by 3 gunmen on motorcycles
1998		SSP/LeJ	Shia massacres in Mazar-i-Sharif and Bamiyan in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan
1998	Jan 11	LeJ	25 Shia mourners massacred in Mominpura graveyard in Lahore
1998	Feb 20	LeJ	Iranian group attacked in Multan; 7 killed
1998	Jun 8	LeJ	Shiite Dr. Jafar Hussain shot in Multan
1998	Sep 10	LeJ	Shiite Dr. Iqbal Jafri killed in Multan
1998	Sep 15	SSP	Shiite mosque set ablaze near Islamabad
1998	Sep 17	SSP	Shiite leader of TJP, Agha Wajeeb Abbas Naqvi, shot dead by 2 men on motorcycle
1998	Sep	SSP	2 killed, 20 wounded when gunmen on motorcycles opened fire on a Shia memorial service in Punjab
1998	Oct 9	SSP	Drive-by shooting of Iranian Cultural Center in Multan--1 guard killed, 1 injured
1998	Oct 23	LeJ	2 people killed in New Multan
1998	Nov 26	LeJ	Nazeer Hussain murdered, motorcycle stolen
1998	Nov 28	SSP	Shiite lawyer Sayed Ansar ul-Hasan and teenage son killed by gunmen on motorcycle in Punjab

1999	Jan	4	SSP	Shia worshippers in Karem Dad Qureshi mosque fired upon by gunmen on motorcycles; 17 killed (including 3 children), 25 wounded
1999	Jan	23	SSP	5 Shiites killed by gunmen on motorcycles
1999	Jan	28	LeJ	6 killed (including 5 police officials) in Multan
1999	Jan		LeJ	Attempted assassination of Nawaz Sharif--bridge blown up before he crossed
1999	Apr	26	SSP	5 killed in Fateh village
1999	Jun	22	LeJ	3 policemen killed in Multan
1999	Sep	28	SSP	Secretary General of TJP, daughter, and bodyguard killed in NWFP
1999	Sep	30	SSP	Shiite activist/lawyer Ejaz Hussain killed in Gujranwala town
1999	Oct	1	SSP	Shia worshippers at Imambargah Hurmain in Karachi attacked by masked gunmen; 9 killed
1999	Oct	1	SSP	Shiite baker/TJP supporter shot dead in his bakery in Multan
1999	Oct	2	SSP	Former President of TJP killed by grenade thrown into his home
1999	Oct	9	LeJ	One constable killed, one wounded in Multan
2000	Feb	8	LeJ	Famous wrestler and brother killed
2000	Apr	7	SSP	Former Sect. Gen. of TJP/Shiite lawyer Waqar Hussain Naqvi, son, and driver killed while dropping off daughter at school
2000	Apr	11	SSP	Crowded Shia mosque in Mulawali attacked by 4 gunmen with grenades, who cut phone lines to stall rescuers; 15 killed, 20 injured
2000	Apr	23	LeJ	Shia Muharram procession attacked in Multan--15 injured
2000	May	3	LeJ	Shiite lawyer Malik Ibrar Husain and father killed in his sweetshop
2000	May	15	LeJ	Voice of Shia leader, Sardar Hussain Jafri, shot dead in Karachi
2000	Aug	13	LeJ	2 policemen killed, 2 injured in Multan
2000	Oct	26	LeJ	Leader of Multan anti-terror squad and female passerby shot by 4 gunmen
2000	Nov	3	SSP	Shiite politician Agha Syed Mehdi & 5 passengers killed by remote-controlled landmine detonated beneath his car in Kashmir
2000	Dec	16	LeJ	4 policemen (including one investigating the LeJ) killed in Lahore
2000	Dec	18	SSP	SSP procession blocks road, pelts vehicles & police with stones, uproots traffic signals, fires into air to incite panic
2001	Jan	20	LeJ	Prominent Iranian Shiite leader, Agha Sultani, killed by gunmen on motorcycles in Karachi
2001	Feb	17	SSP	Shiite lawyer/activist killed by 2 motorcycling gunmen near Multan
2001	Feb	22	SSP	Former Deputy Superintendent of Police and son (both Shia Muslims) killed
2001	Feb	22	SSP	Shia leader killed by assault rifle fire from terrorists riding motorcycle
2001	Feb	23	SSP	Drive-by shooting of Shiite mosque in Rawalpindi; 10 worshippers killed
2001	Feb	28	SSP	Riots, violent clashes with police result in one death after SSP militant is executed
2001	Mar	1	SSP	3 Shiite shopkeepers, 10 others killed in NWFP when gunmen fire into bazaar
2001	Mar	4	LeJ	Random shooting by 6 men on motorcycles near Shia mosque and graveyard kills 13 (including 2 policemen) in Sheikhpura
2001	Apr	2	SSP	Former President of TJP, Vehari, killed when 2 motorcyclists block a road and open fire on his car
2001	Apr	4	SSP	Shia Muharram procession attacked--pelted with stones to halt religious observance
2001	May	18	SSP	Maulana Salim Qadri, Chairman of rival group Sunni Tehrik, killed with 5 others by armed men on motorcycles
2001	May	21	SSP	Shiite youth killed, 2 injured, in Dera Ismail Khan
2001	Jun	14	LeJ	2 Shiites killed, 6 injured by 5 gunmen on motorcycles outside mosque in Multan
2001	Jul	10	SSP	2 Shiites gunned down outside Karachi mosque by men on motorcycles with automatic weapons


2001	Jul	28	LeJ	Shaukat Mirza, Managing Director of Pakistan State Oil, gunned down in Karachi
2001	Jul	30	LeJ	Shiite Syed Zafar Hussain, Director in the Research Laboratories of the Ministry of Defense, gunned down in Karachi
2001	Jul		LeJ	Shiite religious leader, Rizwan-ul Hasa Shah, killed
2001	Jul		LeJ	Former Foreign Minister, Mohammed Siddque Kanju, and former legislator killed in Punjab
2001	Sep	5	SSP	Pesh Imam fatally shot by 4 men on 2 motorcycles
2001	Sep		LeJ	Shia prayer leader, Ali Hussain Naqvi, assassinated
2001	Oct	28	LeO/LeJ/JeM	St. Dominic's Catholic Church attacked by 6 gunmen in Bahawalpur; 17 killed (5 children), dozens injured
2002	Jan	23	LeO/LeJ/JeM	Kidnapping/murder of WSJ reporter Daniel Pearl
2002	Feb	11	SSP	Pak-Iranian Tea Company shopkeeper killed by gunmen on motorcyclists
2002	Feb	26	LeJ	Drive-by shooting at Shiite mosque in Rawalpindi; 11 killed, 14 wounded
2002	Mar	17	LeO/LeJ	Suicide grenade attack on Protestant International Church in Islamabad--U.S. Embassy worker, daughter, and 3 others killed
2002	Apr	26	LeJ	Bomb buried beneath Shiite mosque in Bhakkar explodes, killing 12 women and children, injuring 20; engineer involved
2002	May	6	SSP	Dr. Athar Hussain Rizvi shot by terrorists on motorcycles outside Karachi clinic
2002	May	8	LeO/LeJ/HUM-A	Suicide car bombing on bus outside Sheraton Hotel; 16 killed (including 11 French engineers)
2002	May	14	LeJ	LeJ leader Riaz Basra, 3 others killed while trying to assassinate Shiite religious leader
2002	Jun	12	LeO/LeJ/HUM-A	Suicide car bombing at US Consulate kills 12 Pakistanis; Al Qanoon claims responsibility
2002	Aug	5	LeO/JeM/LeJ	Christian school in Murree attacked by gunmen; delayed by locked doors, only 6 are killed
2002	Aug	9	LeO/HUM-A/JeM/LeJ	Suicide grenade attack on Christian hospital in Taxila; 4 nurses killed, 25 wounded
2002	Sept	25	LeO/JeM/LeJ	Institute for Peace and Justice office attacked by gunmen in Karachi
2002	Oct	16	LeJ	10 parcel bombs sent to police, government officials; 3 explode, injuring 9
2002	Nov		LeJ	Shia leader Anwer Ali Akhunzada shot dead in Peshawar market
2003	Feb	22	LeJ	9 Shiites (including a child) killed by gunmen on motorcycles after watching World Cup cricket match near Karachi mosque
2003	Mar	14	SSP	Terrorists drive tractor into Shia Muharram procession, killing a young girl and injuring 3
2003	Mar		LeJ	Planned assassinations of police, complainants, informers, witnesses in sectarian cases
2003	Jun	8	LeJ	12 Shiite police cadets killed, 8 wounded by gunmen on motorcycles in Quetta
2003	Jul	4	313/LeJ	54 Shias killed, 65 wounded in suicide bombing, rifle, and grenade attack on Shia mosque in Quetta
2003	Oct	3	313/LeJ	Bus carrying Shiite employees of SUPARCO attacked by gunmen on motorcycles in Karachi; 7 dead, 7 wounded
2003	Oct	7	SSP	Tariq mourners become rioters: shops/restaurants damaged, cinema and Shia shrine burned--one killed
2003	Oct	8	SSP	Shiite mosque burned in Jhang after Tariq's funeral
2003	Dec	14	LeO/LeJ/JeM	Assassination attempt on Musharraf using C-4 explosive
2003	Dec	25	LeO/LeJ/JeM	Assassination attempt on Musharraf--suicide bombers rammed vehicles laden with C-4 into his motorcade; 46 injured
2004	Jan	15	LeJ	Bomb blast in parking area of Karachi's Holy Trinity Church, near Bible Society; 15 injured, cars damaged

2004	Mar	2	LeJ	Gunmen on balconies spray Shia procession with gunfire as suicide bombers detonate selves in Quetta--44 dead, 150 injured
2004	Apr	4	LeJ	Police station stormed, officers forced to recite Quran then shot in Karachi; 5 killed
2004	May	7	LeJ	Suicide bombing (by policeman) at Shia Hyderi mosque in Karachi--22 dead, 150 wounded
2004	May	31	LeJ	21 Shiites at Ali Raza mosque killed by suicide bomber in Karachi
2004	Jul	4	LeJ	57 Shiites killed in suicide attack on Quetta mosque
2004	Sep	10	LeJ	Shiite university professor shot dead in Quetta; gunmen fled on motorcycle
2004	Oct	1	LeJ	Suicide bomber (with briefcase bombs) detonates self in Shiite mosque in Sialkot; 25 dead, 50 wounded
2004	Dec		LeJ	Agha Khan Health Center attacked and set ablaze; 2 killed

Abbreviations:

SSP	Sipah-e-Sahaba
LeJ	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
TJP	Tehreek-e-Jaferia
NWFP	North-West Frontier Province
LeO	Lashkar-e-Omar
JeM	Jaish-e-Mohammad
WSJ	<i>Wall Street Journal</i>
HUM-A	Harakat ul-Mujahedin al-Alami
SUPARCO	Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission

Appendix 2: Development of the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan



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