U.S.: Miami's 'Kramer' Jihadists

June 23, 2006

U.S. agents raided a warehouse in Miami's poor, ethnically diverse Liberty City neighborhood June 22 and arrested seven Muslims allegedly involved in a plot to bomb Chicago's 110-story Sears Tower and wage other attacks against the United States. Although grandiose, the plot apparently had barely gotten off the ground before it was uncovered. The case is an example of "Kramer" jihadists at work—which is not to suggest the threat was hollow.

The federal grand jury indictment contends that the suspects, several U.S. citizens and at least one Haitian illegal immigrant, had pledged loyalty to al Qaeda and were seeking support—including weapons, vehicles and uniforms—from the global jihadist network to carry out attacks. Neighbors told reporters on the scene the suspects were members of a group of about 50 people formed in 2005 and known as the Seas of David. Members follow a disciplined, austere lifestyle and consider themselves to be ''soldiers of God,'' the neighbors said.

According to the indictment, cell organizer Narseal Batiste told an undercover informant in December 2005 that members hoped to "kill all the devils we can" in spectacular attacks that would be "just as good or greater than 9/11." Batiste allegedly told the undercover informant—whom he presumed was an al Qaeda operative—he wanted to organize an "Islamic army" in the United States to carry out a "full ground war."

Group members, who authorities said are between 22 and 32 years old, operated out of a warehouse and were observed to have posted guards outside. Neighbors said members often emerged late at night and performed exercises reminiscent of those performed by trainees at military camps. The gang activity and high crime level in Liberty City provided a degree of cover for the cell's activities and allowed members to blend in with the local inhabitants. This methodology is similar to that of other homegrown cells in the United States, such as Jamaat al-Fuqra and Virginia Jihad Network.

The cell is an example of Stratfor's al Qaeda 3.0 model: grassroots jihadists working under local leaders to attack a country with which they have a long association—as opposed to operatives deployed by the central al Qaeda command from overseas to conduct a strike in a foreign country.

The Liberty City cell might have had grandiose plans to wage jihad against the United States, but like many would-be militants in the country, it lacked the technical means and sophistication to carry out its plot. Members were, in other words, what Stratfor has termed "Kramer jihadists": those who aspire to commit spectacular, devastating attacks but, because of errors in tradecraft (or, occasionally, personal quirks), frequently are characterized as bumbling fools.

Although its lack of sophistication and the relative ease with which it was penetrated puts the cell in the amateur category, it could have caused great damage had it been in contact with an experienced militant operational commander instead of an informant. According to the indictment, the group surveilled FBI buildings in North Miami Beach and took videos and photos of other federal buildings in Miami-Dade County. This indicates the group was at least in the target selection or the pre-operational surveillance phase of its plot.

Compared to the alleged militant plots uncovered in Atlanta and Toronto, the Liberty City cell was much less advanced. It had only expressed the intent to commit attacks against targets in the United States, but had made no effort to acquire the explosives needed to carry them out. Had cell members been talking to an experienced al Qaeda operational commander, and not an FBI informant, the alleged plot could have developed into a significant attack.

© Copyright 2006 Strategic Forecasting Inc.